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Part I 
The Nature of Reasoning 
Reasoning as a Mental Process 
  
Abstract 
What kinds of transitions in the mind constitute inference? A powerful 
idea, found in Frege, is that inference from state X to state Y requires 
the inferrer to represent in some way that X supports Y. This chapter 
argues that this model of inference would be stable and motivated only 
if the inferring subjects met a self-awareness condition, in which they 
are aware or can become aware by reflection of what they are 
inferentially responding to and why. It argues against the model on 
the grounds that a large class of mental transitions meet the hallmarks 
of inference yet fail to meet the self-awareness condition. It argues 
that a better model for inference drops the self-awareness condition 
and allows that subjects regularly draw inferences even when they do 
not represent what they are inferentially responding to or why. 
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Inference without Reckoning 
Susanna Siegel 
Inference is a paradigm of person-level reasoning that redounds well 
or badly on the subject.  Inferences can be epistemically better or 
worse, depending on the epistemic status of the premises and the 
relationship between the premises and the conclusions. For example, if 
you infer from poorly justified beliefs, or from experiences or intuitions 
that fail to provide any justification (e.g., you know they are false, or 
have reason not to endorse them), your conclusion will be poorly 
justified. The hallmark of inference is that the conclusions drawn by 
inferrers epistemically depend on the premises from which they are 
drawn. 
We can be more exact about the inputs and upshots of 
inference than is allowed by the terms “premises” and “conclusions.” 
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It can be natural to use these words to label either psychological 
entities or propositions that are their contents. Both uses can be 
useful. But the inputs and upshots of inference are psychological 
entities, and these are the things that stand in relations of epistemic 
dependence of the sort characteristic of inference. If you infer a 
state with content Q (a Q-state) from a state with content P (a P-
state), then your Q-state epistemically depends on your P-state. But 
if the inference is poor, then the proposition Q may not depend 
logically, semantically, or in any other way on the proposition P.1 
Other relations of epistemic dependence could be defined for 
                                               
1 I’m talking here and elsewhere as if psychological entities involved in 
inference are psychological states, rather than being either states or 
events. If judgments are events rather than states, this usage would 
suggest misleadingly that judgments are never relata of inferences. I’m 
omitting mention of events merely for brevity. 
Conclusion-states include beliefs, but other psychological states can be 
conclusion-states as well. Some inferences begin from suppositions, and 
issue in conclusions in which one merely accepts a proposition, without 
believing it. Here one uses inference to explore the consequences of a 
supposition, when it is combined with other things you accept or believe. 
In other cases, one might accept a proposition for practical purposes. That 
kind of acceptance can be either a premise-state or a conclusion-state. 
propositions, but those dependence relations are not necessarily the 
kind that is established by inference.2 
Some phenomena aptly labeled “inference” don’t redound on 
the subject’s rational standing at all. For instance, inferences in 
which the premise-states are states of early vision with no epistemic 
power to justify beliefs fall into this category. Here I set those 
phenomena aside. 
What makes a mental transition redound on the subject’s 
rational standing in the specifically inferential way? According to a 
natural and forceful answer to this question, inference constitutively 
involves a kind of self-awareness. For instance, Paul Boghossian 
holds that inference is a form of person-level reasoning, which he 
says meets the following condition: 
 
Self-awareness condition. “Person-level reasoning 
[is] mental action that a person performs, in which 
he is either aware, or can become aware, of why he 
                                               
2 For instance, Laplace (1814) and Chalmers (2012) explore relationships of 
knowability, in order to probe what else you could know a priori, if you 
knew all the propositions in a carefully defined minimal subclass. 
is moving from some beliefs to others.” (Boghossian 
2014, p. 16) 
 
If inference meets the self-awareness condition, then inferrers are 
never ignorant of the fact that they are responding to some of their 
psychological states, or why they are so responding. 
What is inference like when it satisfies the self-awareness 
condition? Consider the proposal that one draws an inference by 
registering some information (where information can include 
misinformation) and reckoning that it supports the conclusion, with 
the result that one reaches the conclusion. On this model, the 
inferential route to drawing a conclusion has three components: the 
premise-states from which one infers, a reckoning state in which 
one reckons that the premise-states support the conclusion, and a 
“becausal” condition according to which one reaches a conclusion 
from the premise-states because one reckons that they support it. If 
this picture of inference had a slogan, it might be that in inference, 
one concludes because one reckons. The reckoning model is 
arguably found in Frege and discussed by many thinkers after him.3 
                                               
3 Frege (1979) writes: “To make a judgment because we are cognisant of 
other truths as providing a justification for it is known as inferring.” As 
The reckoning model of inference can specify the structure and 
components of inference that ensure that thinkers meet the self-
awareness condition. Thanks to the reckoning state, reasoners do 
not infer in ignorance of what they are responding to. And thanks to 
the reckoning state’s role in producing the inference’s conclusion, 
the things to which reasoners respond are also reasons for which 
they draw their conclusions. 
In principle, the reckoning model could be divorced from the 
self-awareness condition on person-level reasoning. But since the 
reckoning model is motivated by the self-awareness condition, and 
since it serves the self-awareness construal of person-level 
reasoning so well, I’ll say the reckoning model is canonical when it 
meets the self-awareness condition. 
Via the self-awareness condition, the canonical reckoning 
model entails that inferrers can become aware of why they are 
moving from some beliefs to others, if they aren’t so aware already. 
The canonical becausal condition is therefore a first-person 
rationalization of why the conclusion is drawn—not a merely causal 
                                               
Boghossian (2014) and others point out, Frege’s formulation would restrict 
inference only to cases in which the judgment is justified by truths and one 
knows this. 
condition. For example, if you infer that the streets are wet from the 
fact (as you see it) that it rained last night, then on the canonical 
reckoning model, you’re aware that you believe that it rained last 
night, and that you take that fact to support the conclusion that the 
streets are wet. If asked why you believe the streets are wet, you 
could answer, correctly, that you believe this because it rained last 
night. The premise-states from which you draw your conclusion are 
accessible to reflection. 
In the rest of this chapter, I argue that subjects can draw 
inferences in ignorance of the exact factors they are responding to. 
Inference can fail to satisfy the self-awareness condition, and 
therefore the canonical reckoning model is not true of all person-
level reasoning. My argumentative strategy is to present putative 
cases of inference in which subjects fail to meet the self-awareness 
condition. If these situations are cases of inference, the canonical 
reckoning model cannot recognize them as such. If these are cases 
of inference that the canonical reckoning model cannot account for, 
a natural next question is whether the fault is with the reckoning 
model per se, or with the self-awareness condition that makes the 
model canonical. To address this question, I consider non-reckoning 
models that keep reckoning but divorce it from the self-awareness 
condition. 
I will argue that non-canonical reckoning models are either 
poorly motivated or else they face internal instabilities. The best way 
to account for the broad range of cases exemplified by my examples 
may then be by analyzing inference without appeal to reckoning. To 
bring such an alternative into focus, I present an approach to 
inference that leaves reckoning behind, and identify the family of 
rational responses to which it belongs. 
1. Inference without Self-awareness: 
Examples 
Sometimes when one categorizes what one perceives, one is not 
aware of which features lead one to categorize as one does. Consider 
the following example of categorizing a behavioral disposition. 
 
Kindness. The person ahead of you in line at the 
Post Office is finding out from the clerk about the 
costs of sending a package. Their exchange of 
information is interspersed with comments about 
recent changes in the postal service and the most 
popular stamps. As you listen you are struck with 
the thought that the clerk is kind. You could not 
identify what it is about the clerk that leads you to 
this thought. Nor could you identify any 
generalizations that link these cues to kindness. 
Though you don’t know it, you are responding to a 
combination of what she says to the customer, her 
forthright and friendly manner, her facial 
expressions, her tone of voice, and the way she 
handles the packages. 
 
By hypothesis, there are some features of the clerk (facial expressions, 
manner, etc.) such that you reach the judgment that she is kind by 
responding to those features. And let’s assume that kindness is not 
represented in your perceptual experience of the clerk. If it were, the 
judgment would be a case of endorsing an experience, rather than an 
inference made in response to one’s perceptual experience.4 
In other cases, one forms a judgment in response to a set of 
diverse factors, without being aware of everything one is responding 
to. Consider this example: 
                                               
4 Arguably believing P on the basis of an experience with content P can be an 
inference, since one is drawing on information one has already in a 
rationally evaluable way, and that’s a hallmark of inference. But there isn’t 
any need to pursue this question here. 
 Pepperoni. Usually you eat three slices of pizza 
when it comes with pepperoni. But tonight, after 
eating one slice, you suddenly don’t want any more. 
Struck by your own uncharacteristic aversion, you 
form the belief that the pizza is yucky. Though you 
don’t know it, you’re responding to the facts that (i) 
the pepperoni tastes very salty to you, (ii) it looks 
greasy, (iii) it reminds you of someone you don’t 
like, who you recently learned loves pepperoni, and 
(iv) you have suddenly felt the force of moral 
arguments against eating meat. If the next bites of 
pepperoni were less salty, the greasy appearance 
turned out to be glare from the lights, you learned 
that your nemesis now avoids pepperoni, and the 
moral arguments didn’t move you, the conclusion of 
your inference would weaken, and so would your 
aversion. You haven’t classified what you see and 
taste as: too greasy, too salty, reminiscent of your 
nemesis, or the sad product of immoral practices. 
Nor are you consciously thinking right now about 
any of these things. 
 By hypothesis, there are features of the pizza (greasy, salty) and of 
your mind (you’re reminded of nemesis, you feel the force of moral 
argument) that you’re responding to, when you conclude that the 
pizza is yucky. 
On the canonical reckoning model, the kindness and pepperoni 
cases are therefore not cases of inference. This result seems 
implausible. Both cases meet the main diagnostic of inference: 
epistemic dependence. You could have better or worse reasons for 
the conclusion in each case, and that would make the conclusion 
better or worse. For instance, the fact that your nemesis likes it is a 
poor reason to take the pepperoni to be undesirable. It is generally 
irrational to avoid pepperoni because your nemesis likes it, but 
people often respond irrationally in just this way.5 Perhaps the 
grease, salt, and moral considerations are better. 
Epistemic dependence is also plainly evident in the kindness 
case. More description would be needed to determine how rational 
or irrational the response is, but it clearly has some status along this 
dimension. The features responded to in the kindness case might be 
poor grounds for concluding that the clerk is kind (who knows what 
                                               
5 Tamir and Mitchell (2012) 
she is like in other circumstances? Maybe she just moves carefully 
by habit unrelated to considering the value the package has for the 
sender or recipient). Alternatively, you might have good reason to 
take those features to indicate kindness. 
If the kindness and pepperoni cases are inferences, neither of 
them are conscious inferences, even thought they result in 
conscious judgments as their conclusion-state. But this feature of 
them does not preclude their being inferences, because in general 
the process of inferring doesn’t have to feel like anything. You don’t 
necessarily have to think anything to yourself, in inner speech or 
otherwise. You don’t have to rehearse the reasoning that brought 
you to the conclusion. For example, while walking along a rainy 
street, you might come to a puddle and think that it is too big to hop 
across, so you will have to go around it. You need not think to 
yourself that you have to walk around the puddle if you want to 
keep your feet dry. A child playing hide and seek might not look for 
her opponent on the swing set, because the swings provide no place 
to hide, and hiding in plain sight is an option she doesn’t consider.6 
These inferences do not involve any more cognitive 
sophistication than what’s needed to play hide and seek, or to keep 
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one’s feet dry. Yet it is clear that the thinkers in these cases end up 
drawing their conclusions by responding to information they have, 
and that their conclusion-states epistemically depend on the 
information they respond to. If you underestimate your own puddle-
hopping abilities because you are excessively fear-ridden, your 
conclusion that you have to go around is ill-founded, and it is ill-
founded because it is based on an ill-founded assumption that you 
can’t jump such long distances. This case differs psychologically 
from cases of inference in which one rehearses the premises or 
conclusion to oneself or someone else. But it issues in the same 
relationship of epistemic dependence of a conclusion-state on other 
psychological states. 
The only way for the reckoning model to respect the verdict 
that the kindness and pepperoni transitions are inferences is to 
adjust the reckoning state and its role in inference so that neither of 
them (alone or together) entails the self-awareness condition. Can 
the reckoning model be reinterpreted to account for them? 
2. How to Lack Self-awareness in Inferring Q 
from P 
To see what non-canonical reckoning might look like, let us zero in 
more closely on the kinds of self-ignorance it would have to respect. 
To analyze these kinds of self-ignorance, it is useful to have labels for 
the features to which the inferrer responds. So let’s unpack the 
premise-states in each case further, starting with the kindness case. 
Let’s say that Q = the proposition that the clerk is kind, and F 
is the cluster of features F1, F2, F3, that you respond to in concluding 
Q. Registering F and attributing it to the clerk amount to believing 
the premise the clerk has F. Being aware that you registered F and 
attributed it to the clerk is therefore a form of premise-state 
awareness. 
For the sake of argument, let’s assume that when you register 
features F, F = a cluster of features the clerk actually has. (In a 
more complex example, your representation of the features could be 
falsidical, rather than veridical.) 
We can then distinguish two main ways to fail to meet the 
self-awareness condition: premise-state unawareness and response-
unawareness. The subject in the kindness case is response-unaware 
just in case she is unaware (and unable to become aware by 
reflection) that she concluded Q because she responded to F. And 
she is premise-state unaware just in case she is unaware (and 
unable to become aware by reflection) that she registers F and 
attributes it to the relevant thing(s). As I’ve defined these two forms 
of self-ignorance, premise-state unawareness entails response-
unawareness. If one is unaware that one is in premise-state X, then 
one is unaware that one has responded to X.7 
The kindness and pepperoni cases underdescribe the exact 
configurations of unawareness. There are several such 
configurations, but I’ll focus mainly on two of them. 
In the first configuration, premise-state awareness combines 
with response-unawareness. For example, you are aware that you 
register the clerk’s kind manner, but unaware that you are 
concluding that she’s kind because of her manner. Schematically: 
you are aware that you registered F and attributed those features to 
the clerk, but unaware that you responded to F in concluding Q. This 
configuration also characterizes a natural version of the pepperoni 
case in which one is aware that one has noticed that conditions (i) 
and (ii) hold, but unaware that one is responding to the features 
described in those conditions (saltiness and greasiness). 
In the second configuration, premise-state unawareness 
combines with response-unawareness if one is both unaware that 
                                               
7 Premise-state unawareness can also occur alongside a different form of 
response-awareness, in which you are aware that you have responded to 
something in drawing your conclusion, but unaware that it is premise-state 
X. 
one responded to F, and unaware that one registered F at all. In the 
pepperoni case, an inferrer may be unaware of conditions (iii) or 
(iv), by being unaware that pepperoni puts her in mind of the fact 
that her nemesis likes pepperoni. Similarly, the inferrer might be 
unaware that she has felt the force of arguments against eating 
meat. 
Assuming that the pepperoni inferrer is unaware that she’s 
registering (iii) and (iv), she is also unaware that she’s registering 
the conjunction of features (i)–(iv). Those features have no internal 
unity. They’re a mere aggregate. 
Analogously, if the inferrer in the kindness case registers each 
of the features in F taken individually, it’s a further claim that she 
attributes the conjunction of features to the clerk. What’s needed for 
premise-state awareness is awareness that she attributes the 
conjunction F to the clerk. If she doesn’t attribute the conjunction to 
the clerk, then she can’t be aware that she does. And in a natural 
version of the case, if she does attribute it, she’s unaware that she 
does. 
Besides premise-state unawareness and response-
unawareness, there is also an intermediate form of premise-
unawareness, which combines conceptual premise-unawareness 
with non-conceptual premise-awareness. Here, the pepperoni-
refuser may register (i) and (ii)—the pizza’s being greasy and 
salty—without registering them as greasy and salty. This distinction 
lets us describe more exact versions of the kindness and pepperoni 
case. But those other versions aren’t necessary for making the case 
against the canonical reckoning model, so I leave them aside.8 
3. Unawareness in the Hands of the 
Reckoning Model 
To account for cases of inference without self-awareness, the 
reckoning model has to adjust two of its main components: the 
reckoning state, in which the inferrer reckons that P supports Q; and 
the becausal condition, in which the inferrer concludes that Q because 
she reckons that P supports Q. The reckoning state in non-canonical 
reckoning must allow for premise-state unawareness, and the becausal 
state must allow for response-unawareness. 
What does the becausal condition look like when the self-
awareness condition is dropped? The canonical “becausal” condition 
                                               
8 I will also set aside another kind of self-ignorance potentially present in the 
cases, in which you are aware that you registered F, but unaware that you 
attributed F to the clerk. 
entails at a minimum that the premise-states (or their contents) 
figure in a correct first-person rationalization of the conclusion that 
the inferrer could provide. You can explain that you concluded Q 
because: P. And you can explain that, because you reckon that: P 
supports Q. 
If response-unawareness precludes any such first-person 
rationalization, then a different interpretation of the “becausal” 
condition is needed. The natural proposal is that the becausal 
condition is merely causal. 
 
Merely causal “becausal.” The inferrer concludes 
that Q because she is in a reckoning state. The fact 
that she reckons that P supports Q causes her to 
conclude Q in response to P. She has available no 
correct first-person rationalization of why she 
concludes Q. 
 
An internal instability arises when the merely causal becausal condition 
is combined with non-canonical reckoning states that I’ll call reckoning 
de dicto, as opposed to reckoning de re. 
4. Reckoning De Dicto 
It’s consistent with the kindness and pepperoni cases that the inferrer 
might correctly sense that there are some features to which she has 
responded, while being unable to identify what features those are. For 
instance, if asked why one judged that the clerk is kind, one might say 
something like, “I can’t quite put my finger on it, but she just seemed 
to act kindly.” Given our assumption for the sake of argument that 
kindness (the property) is not presented in the experience, this type of 
report wouldn’t be a report of perceptual experience. In the pepperoni 
case, one might invent some reason for which one judges that 
pepperoni is yucky (“It doesn’t taste right”—even if it tastes the same 
way it always does. Here too, we can assume that the contents of 
experience are unaffected by the conclusion). 
The reckoning model can analyze these mental states by 
invoking a reckoning state in which the inferrer existentially 
quantifies over features she responds to, and the reckoning has 
wide scope over this quantifier. 
 
Reckoning de dicto. S reckons that (for some G: 
having G supports Q). 
 
In reckoning de dicto, you believe that there are some features of the 
person such that she has those features, and the fact that she has 
those features supports the conclusion that she is kind, while having 
no beliefs (or other forms of opinion, such as intuition or suspicion) 
about which features play this role. 
As an analysis of what kind of reckoning might occur in the 
cases, this seems to respect the basic forms of response-
unawareness and premise-unawareness, while still preserving a 
recognizable kind of reckoning. So invoking a de dicto reckoning 
state is a way for non-canonical reckoning to occur in inference 
without self-awareness. 
But de dicto reckoning fits poorly with the becausal condition 
in non-canonical reckoning. In the kindness and pepperoni cases, 
what causes you to draw the conclusion is (by hypothesis) that you 
respond to the particular features—F in the kindness case. They 
therefore do not conclude because they reckon de dicto, in a way 
that fails to specify the features. 
The non-canonical reckoning model predicts that if your 
reckoning state is de dicto, then you draw the conclusion because 
you reckon de dicto that some features or other support the 
conclusion. That prediction goes against a central feature of the 
cases, which is that there are specific features you’re responding to 
in drawing the conclusion. You are in the de dicto reckoning state 
because you are responding to the specific features that by 
hypothesis move you to the conclusion. Your reaching the conclusion 
is explained by that response, not by the de dicto reckoning state. 
When combined with a de dicto reckoning state, then, the 
becausal condition posits the de dicto reckoning state as the 
putative cause of drawing the conclusion. Here lies its mistake. The 
de dicto reckoning state is not proportional to the causal upshot of 
drawing the conclusion, and therefore lacks explanatory force. The 
explanatory weight is carried by the fact that you respond to specific 
features. 
In a non-canonical reckoning model, then, the only admissible 
reckoning states seems to be states of reckoning de re. 
 
Reckoning de re. For some F (S reckons that: 
having F supports Q). 
 
Like reckoning de dicto, reckoning de re can in principle respect the 
two kinds of self-ignorance we’ve focused on: premise-state 
unawareness and response-unawareness. For instance, reckoning de 
re could be entirely inaccessible: 
 Inaccessible reckoning. You are unaware and can’t 
become aware by reflection that you reckon that: P 
supports Q. 
 
On the reckoning model, reckoning must be inaccessible, when there is 
premise-state unawareness or response-unawareness. 
Unlike reckoning de dicto, inaccessible reckoning de re fits 
perfectly well with the merely causal becausal condition. Whereas 
reckoning de dicto would (ceteris paribus) make available a first-
person rationalization, inaccessible reckoning de re does not make 
available that kind of becausal condition. Inaccessible reckoning de 
re is a way to preserve the reckoning model while accounting for 
inference without self-awareness. 
When the self-awareness condition is met, reckoning de re 
adds a lot. It precludes the sense that the inferrer proceeds in 
ignorance of what she is responding to. 
It also opens up a potential problem made vivid by Lewis 
Carroll: the threat that the reckoning state would be forced into the 
role of a premise, leading to a regress. That threat arises for any 
kind of reckoning state, accessible or otherwise. Proponents of the 
reckoning model have proposed various answers to the threat.9 De 
re reckoning, like reckoning in general, needs a solution to the 
regress problem. 
What, if anything, does inaccessible reckoning add to the fact 
that you respond to features F or (i)–(iv)? It is hard to say. Given 
that you respond to particular features, is it necessary to posit any 
further structure to have an illuminating account of inference? 
In the rest of this chapter, I give some reasons to think that 
the nature of inference may be illuminated even without positing 
any structure beyond what’s posited by the hypothesis that inferring 
is a distinctive kind of response to an informational state, or to a 
combination of such states, that produces a conclusion. I’ll call this 
hypothesis the response hypothesis. The distinctively inferential kind 
of response to information is formed when one reaches a conclusion. 
The reckoning model entails the response hypothesis, but the 
response hypothesis does not entail the reckoning model. 
We can understand quite a bit about what inference is by 
contrasting it with neighboring mental phenomena and reflecting on 
                                               
9 Recent examples include Chudnoff (2014) and Pavese (ms). 
what underlies these contrasts. The remaining discussion is an 
exercise in illumination without analysis. 
5. What Kind of Response is Inferring? 
It is useful to begin by looking more closely as what kinds of response 
inferential responses could be. In English, “response” can denote a 
mental state that one comes to be in by a certain dialectical process. 
For instance, a response to a question can be an answer. X’s response 
to Y’s claim can be to deny it. A response to a line of reasoning can be 
a belief. For instance, suppose you rehearse for me your reasoning 
that the tree’s apricots are ripe, because apricots ripen when they’re 
pale orange, and the apricots on the tree are pale orange. In response 
to the part of your reasoning that follows “because,” I too, like you, 
might form the belief that the apricots on the tree are ripe. It would be 
natural to say that one of my responses to this part of your reasoning 
is the same as your response: it’s to believe that the apricots are ripe. 
These observations about English suggest that when we 
examine inference as closely as we have to, when trying to 
understand its nature, we will find several different things in the 
same vicinity, all of which are natural to call “responses.” First, there 
is the route by which one came to the belief, which in the apricot 
example is: inferring. Attempts to analyze the inference need a label 
for this route. In contrast, there is the conclusion-state at the end of 
this route, which in the apricot example is a belief. Finally, there is 
the conjunction of these two things, and this conjunction is arguably 
what’s denoted by the most natural uses of “response” in English. 
When we say “Y’s response to X’s claim that P was to deny it,” we 
are denoting not only Y’s claim that P is false, independently of what 
prompted it. We are also saying that Y claimed that P is false, in 
response to X. We are identifying a mental state in part by the type 
of route by which it was formed. In the apricot example, this kind of 
response is the belief that the apricots are ripe, together with the 
route by which that belief is formed. 
The response hypothesis is that inferring is a distinctive way of 
responding to information state that produces a conclusion. If the 
response hypothesis is true, then the distinctively inferential 
response is a locus of epistemic appraisal. An adequate theory of 
that type of response should identify the dimensions along which 
inferences can be epistemically better or worse. When the 
conclusion of inference is a belief, these will be dimensions of 
justification. 
In explicating the notion of a response, I’ll initially talk as if 
inputs are evidence. But the status of inputs as evidence is not 
essential to the notion of response. What’s important is that the 
inputs are informational states of the subject. 
What is it to respond to evidence that one has? Consider 
ordinary updating of beliefs. If you see someone in the room walk 
through an exit, normally you’ll believe they are not in the room 
anymore. This is an automatic adjustment of belief in response to 
changing perceptions. Responses to evidence are often less 
automatic when it takes some effort to recall the relevant facts (how 
far are you from your destination? How many miles per gallon does 
the car get?) and to think the matter through. In both cases, 
responses to evidence involve some ordinary sense in which you 
appreciate the force of the evidence you are responding to, even if 
the “appreciation” takes the form of registering support rather than 
a representational state, such as belief or an intuition, that the 
evidence rationally supports the proposition you come to believe.10 
It seems doubtful that the mental activity involved in responding to 
                                               
10 For discussions of other forms appreciation might in principle take, see 
Fumerton (1976), Audi (1986, 2001), Tucker (2012), and Boghossian 
(2014). Since “appreciation” is factive, these examples must be construed 
as ones in which the evidence does in fact support what you come to 
believe. 
evidence can be explained in terms of any other psychological 
notion. 
The notion of a response can be brought further into focus by 
contrasting it with a range of different relations that a subject could 
stand in to psychological states, distinct from inferentially 
responding to them. These relations group into three kinds: failures 
to respond to informational states; responses to something other 
than informational states; and non-inferential responses to 
informational states. 
5.1. Failures to respond: mental jogging and bypass 
The first relation is the relation of failing to respond to in any way at 
all to an informational state. 
First, suppose that after looking in three rooms for your 
passport, you form the belief that it isn’t anywhere else in the 
house. The mere sequence of searching and then forming the belief 
does not settle what kind of response the belief is to the information 
you got from searching, if it is any response at all. You could form 
the belief spontaneously, without its being any sort of response to 
the information you got from looking—not even an epistemically 
poor response in which you jump to the conclusion that your 
passport is lost. 
Two subjects could move from the same mental states to the 
same conclusions, where only one of them is inferring the conclusion 
from the initial mental states. The other one’s mind is simply moving 
from one set of states to another. Adapting an irresistible term from 
John Broome, we could call a transition from informational state A to 
informational state B “mental jogging” when state B is not any kind 
of response to state A.11 What’s the difference between mental 
jogging and inferring? A natural suggestion is that whereas there is 
no response in mental jogging, there is in inference. If you drew an 
inference from the information you got while looking for your 
passport, perhaps together with some background assumptions, you 
were responding to the information and assumptions. 
                                               
11 Broome (2013) uses “mental jogging” to denote a more limited 
phenomenon, which is a foil for reasoning as he construes it. Broome 
writes: “Active reasoning is a particular sort of process by which conscious 
premise-attitudes cause you to acquire a conclusion-attitude. The process 
is that you operate on the contents of your premise-attitudes following a 
rule, to construct the conclusion, which is the content of a new attitude of 
yours that you acquire in the process. Briefly: reasoning is a rule-governed 
operation on the contents of your conscious attitudes” (p. 234). By 
contrast, for Broome, mental jogging is an inference-like transition in 
which you reach the conclusion from them without following a rule. 
In the case where information is evidence that a subject has, 
she could bypass that evidence, instead of drawing inferences from 
it. You could have some evidence that the café is closed on Mondays 
(for instance, by knowing that it is closed on Mondays), and yet 
nonetheless plan to have lunch at that café on Monday, failing to 
take into account your knowledge that the café will be closed then. 
You are not discounting that evidence, because you are not even 
responding to it at all in believing that you will have lunch at that 
café on Monday. 
Another example of bypassing evidence comes from a kind of 
change-blindness in which you fixate on an object that changes size, 
yet you fail to adjust your beliefs in response to the information 
about the size change that we may presume you have taken in, 
given your fixation on the object. This phenomenon is illustrated by 
an experiment that uses a virtual reality paradigm.12 In the 
experiment, your task is to select the tall yellow blocks from a series 
of blocks that come down a belt, and move them off to one side. 
Short yellow blocks and blocks of other colors should stay on the 
belt. In the experiment, after you have picked up a tall yellow block 
but before you have put it in its place, the block shrinks (hence the 
                                               
12 Triesch et al. (2003). 
virtual reality set-up). But many subjects keep on with their routine 
of putting the shortened block where it doesn’t belong—in the place 
designated for tall yellow blocks. They are fixating on the block, and 
for the sake of illustrating bypass, we can presume they are 
experiencing the block as short. But they are not discounting this 
information when they maintain their belief that the block belongs 
with the other tall yellow ones. They are not even responding to this 
information. Their belief that the block is (still) tall and yellow 
bypasses evidence that it is short. 
Bypass is a special case of mental jogging, as these relations 
have been defined. The concept of bypassing evidence is useful, 
since it highlights a form of mental jogging that is epistemically 
detrimental. 
So far, I’ve contrasted inferring with mental jogging from one 
informational state to the next, and in particular with bypassing the 
information in an informational state. The difference between 
inferring and these relationships is well captured by the idea that the 
subject is responding to information in inference, but is not 
responding to it in any way in the other cases. 
The next two relations highlight the differences between what 
one responds to in inference, and what one responds to in other 
cases: processes fueled by rhythm and rhyme, and association 
between concepts. 
5.2. Responses to non-informational states: rhythm 
and rhyme, and association 
The second two relations are non-inferential responses to non-
informational states. Suppose you say to yourself silently that sixteen 
people fit in the room. If you went on to hear yourself think that there 
are sixteen days till the next full moon, you might end up making this 
transition because these sentences (half-)rhyme and follow a rhythm 
(“Sixteen people fit in this room. Sixteen days till the next full moon”). 
In the guise of inner speech, the second thought would be a response 
to the rhythm and sound of the first innerly spoken thought. By 
contrast, inferring is not a response to rhythm and rhyme. It is 
indifferent to rhythm and rhyme. 
Responding to information differs from responding to 
concepts. In associative transitions, one responds to the concepts in 
the informational state, rather than to any truth-evaluable portion of 
the state’s content. For instance, suppose that observing at dusk 
that the sky is growing dark, you recall that you need to buy 
lightbulbs. This transition from observation to memory is fueled, 
let’s suppose, by the fact that you associate the concepts “darkness” 
and “light.” Here, truth-evaluable states of observation and memory 
are linked merely by association. But we can distinguish these relata 
of the associative movement from the things to which one is 
responding. One is responding to the concept of darkness, not to the 
truth-evaluable observation of darkness in which it figures. 
Abstracting from the example, the transition from a thought 
involving a concept X (X-thoughts) to thoughts involving Y (Y-
thoughts) puts no constraints on which thoughts these are. 
Whenever one thinks a thought involving the concept “salt”—such as 
that the chips are salty, or that the soup needs more salt, or that 
salt on the roads prevents skidding—one is disposed to think a 
thought—any thought—involving the concept “pepper.” 
Associations leave entirely open what standing attitudes the 
subject has toward the things denoted by the concepts, such as salt 
and pepper. A subject may have zero further opinions about salt and 
pepper. The concepts may be no more related in their mind than the 
words “tic,” “tac,” and “toe.” Which thoughts are triggered is 
constrained only by the linked concepts, not by any attributions a 
subject makes using the concept, such as attributing saltiness to the 
soup. In contrast, in inference, one responds to information that 
admits of predicative structuring. 
5.3. Non-inferential responses: narrative and 
attention 
The third pair of relations are non-inferential responses. For instance, 
thinking that it is dark outside might make you imagine that you could 
turn on the sky by switching on a giant lightbulb. The image of tugging 
a chain to turn on the sky, in turn, makes you remember turning on 
your lamp, and finding that the bulb was burned out. You then recall 
that you need to buy lightbulbs. The transition in your mind from the 
dark-outside thought to the need-lightbulbs thought exploits what one 
knows about lightbulbs, darkness, and light.13 Rather than being an 
                                               
13 Boghossian’s depressive (2014), who is supposed to illustrate a transition 
that isn’t inference, has a wandering mind that creates a narrative 
depicting himself as isolated from those people in the world who are having 
fun, and resonant with suffering people. Upon thinking that he is having 
fun, the depressive goes on to think that there is much suffering in the 
world. The case is not described fully enough to identify what kinds of 
transitions the depressive is making, but on many natural elaborations, 
these transitions would include inferences made in response to aspects of 
his outlook, such as concluding that there is much suffering in the world 
from something like “the fact that I’m having fun is an anomaly.” He may 
already believe the conclusion but arrive at it freshly from this thought. 
inferential response, it is a response to narrative possibilities 
generated by the states that one is in. 
The example makes evident that you need not be drawing a 
poor inference from “It’s dark outside” to “I need to buy lightbulbs,” 
in order to respond to the information that it’s dark outside. The 
norms for generating narratives differ from the norms for 
responding inferentially, even though one could respond in either 
way to the same informational state, such as a thought that it is 
dark outside. A single transition could be a decent development of a 
narrative by the standards of vivid fiction, but poor by the standards 
of inference. 
A different relation to informational states is to direct one’s 
attention. For instance, suppose your belief that there are pelicans 
nearby heightens your awareness of potential pelicans. It puts you 
on the lookout for pelicans. You tend to notice pelicans when they’re 
there. When you notice them, your belief that pelicans are nearby 
does not affect how you interpret what you see. It simply directs 
your attention to places where pelicans are likely to be, without 
otherwise influencing which experiences you have when you attend 
to those places. 
In this kind of case, your belief that pelicans are nearby helps 
explain why you form beliefs that you’d express by saying “I am 
now seeing a pelican” or “There is another pelican.” This 
explanation, however, is mediated by your perception of pelicans. 
And those perceptions would normally give rise to the same beliefs, 
whether or not your attention had originally been directed to the 
pelicans by your prior belief that pelicans are nearby, and whether 
or not you had the prior belief that pelicans are nearby. In contrast, 
for you to infer that you’re seeing a pelican (or that X, which you 
can see, is a pelican) from the belief that pelicans are nearby, you’d 
have to respond to the information (or perhaps misinformation) that 
pelicans are nearby in a special way. This special way is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for the belief to direct your attention toward 
pelicans. 
Schematically, the contrasts drawn so far are between 
inferring Q from P, and these other transitions from a P-state to a Q-
state: 
• mentally jogging from the P-state to the Q-state, for instance by 
bypassing the information in the P-state in forming the Q-state; 
• rhythm and rhyme: moving from P-state to Q-state because 
words used to express P and Q rhyme or follow a rhythmic 
groove; 
• association: moving from the P-state to the Q-state by 
associating a concept occurring in the P-state with a concept 
occurring in the Q-state; 
• constructing a narrative from a P-state using a Q-state; 
• attention: moving to the Q-state because the P-state directs 
your attention to a property that the Q-state is about. 
On the face of it, what’s lacking from these cases is a distinctive way 
of responding to the P-state that produces the Q-state. These 
transitions fail to be inferences, because they lack this kind of 
response. 
5.4. Epistemic differences between poor inference 
and non-inference 
A useful test for whether the contrasts I’ve drawn help illuminate the 
distinctively inferential response is to consider if they shed any light on 
the difference between poor inferences, and the various other non-
inferential relations. 
Recall the example of bypass involving change-blindness. 
Suppose you do not respond to the change in the size of the block. 
You persist in believing that the block is tall, when in fact, the 
(virtual) block has shrunk, and you have taken in this information, 
but have not adjusted your belief or actions. Assuming that you 
have evidence that it is short, your belief that the block is tall is 
maintained in a way that fails to take account of some highly 
relevant evidence. 
This epistemic situation involves bypassing the information 
that the block is blue. Contrast bypassing that information with 
drawing a poor inference from it. You start out believing the block is 
yellow, and then, after the block changes color, you freshly infer 
that the block is yellow, irrationally discounting the blue appearance. 
Here, too, a belief is formed in a way that fails to give some highly 
relevant evidence its proper weight. 
There’s a level of abstraction at which the epistemic flaw in 
both cases is the same: one fails to take proper account of highly 
relevant evidence. The belief that P in both cases lacks propositional 
justification for P. Going with that difference, in both cases, the 
information that the block is blue defeats the belief that the block is 
yellow. And at the same high level of abstraction, in both cases, the 
subject’s ultimate belief that the block is yellow (after the block 
changes color) is ill-founded: it is formed (in the inference case) or 
maintained (in the bypass case) epistemically badly. 
Alongside these similarities, there is also a major epistemic 
difference between the bypass and inference cases. According to the 
response hypothesis, the response to P is the locus of epistemic 
appraisability in inference. It’s the response to P that’s epistemically 
bad-making. The epistemic badness is found along a further 
dimension that is missing in the bypass case. Its badness is not just 
the negative feature of failing to be based on adequate propositional 
justification, or failing to take relevant evidence into account. Nor is 
it the generic feature of being badly based, simpliciter. Instead, the 
badness of the inference is located in the response. If one inferred 
from a blue-block experience that the block is yellow, without any 
assumptions that explain the disconnect between color and apparent 
color, that would be a poor inference. 
More generally, according to the response hypothesis, the 
epistemically relevant features of inference reside in the distinctively 
inferential responses. 
6. Intelligence without Reckoning 
Perhaps the most principled challenge to the response hypothesis is a 
dilemma. Either in inference, one appreciates or registers the rational 
relationship between inferential inputs and conclusions (or purports to 
do so) in the form of a reckoning state, or else one’s mind is merely 
caused to move from one state to another. If there is no such 
reckoning state, then the informational state can make a causal impact 
on the thinker, but cannot make a rational impact. 
The picture of inference without reckoning allows a third 
option. It is possible to respond rationally to an information state 
without a reckoning state that represents what makes that response 
rational. One’s acknowledgment of rational support consists in the 
response, rather than taking the form of a state that represents the 
support relation. 
In allowing self-ignorant inferences, inference without 
reckoning places them in a family of rational responses in which one 
cannot identify what one is responding to. This family arguably 
includes a range of emotional and aesthetic responses. For instance, 
arguably, anger or indignation can be fitting or unfitting, even when 
one cannot identify with any confidence what features of the 
situation are making one angry. One might walk away from an 
interaction indignant and confident that the situation merits that 
response, yet unable to articulate what about the situation has led 
one to feel that way. Similarly, the unbridled joy many people feel 
upon the birth of their children can intelligibly leave them wondering 
exactly what it is about the new configuration of life that makes 
them full of joy. 
In the domain of aesthetic responses, on some plausible 
analyses, finding jokes funny has the same feature. One might 
never be able to pinpoint what makes something funny when it is, 
yet for all that, the joke might merit amusement or not. 
Judgments of beauty as Kant construed them have something 
like this feature as well, in that even when judgments of beauty are 
fitting, they do not result from applying determinate concepts to the 
thing judged beautiful, or from following a rule that takes certain 
types of features of those things as inputs and delivers as the output 
a classification of it as beautiful. “There can be no rule according to 
which someone should be obliged to recognize something as 
beautiful.”14 And on one model of literary criticism, the task of 
criticism is in part precisely to articulate the features of a work that 
are responsible for the impact it has on its readers—both to develop 
those responses further and to explore which initial responses are 
vindicated.15 
These kinds of emotional and aesthetic responses are arguably 
intelligent yet partly self-ignorant responses. In this respect, they 
are directly analogous to self-ignorant inference without reckoning. 
Whereas the canonical reckoning model might be seen as identifying 
the pinnacle of intelligent responses with self-aware inferences, 
inference without reckoning allows that inference can tolerate the 
kinds of self-ignorance described here. Whatever epistemic 
                                               
14 Kant, Critique of Judgment, Book 1, section 8. 
15 For instance, Richards (1924). For discussion, see North (2017). 
improvements might result from being able to pinpoint what one is 
responding to and why, in aesthetic, emotional, or rational domains, 
the initial responses one makes prior to any such attempt can still 
reflect the intelligence of the responder. 
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